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• The Baltic states’ previous huge current account deficits turned to surpluses by
2009, but competitiveness improvements are still needed.
• The problems of the overvalued exchange rate and the large stock of foreign
currency loans cannot be solved by any of the options (maintaining the pegged
exchange rate, devaluation, introduction of a floating rate) available to the Baltics.
• The best option would be ‘immediate’ euro entry at a suitable exchange rate
supported by appropriate resolution to manage the debt overhang, but there is no
legal basis for this.
• It is in the broader European interest to prevent a collapse in the Baltics, and to help
medium-term economic growth. Any solution should not be Baltic-specific and
should not incur a risk of moral hazard.
• There are serious concerns about the euro accession criteria. The EU treaty obliges
the Council to lay down the details of the convergence criteria and the excessive
deficit procedure. It is time to fulfil this task and to strengthen the economic
rationale of the criteria.
This policy contribution was prepared for the conference ‘The Future of the Baltic Sea Region in Europe’, 27-
28 August 2009 in Hamina, Finland, organised to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the Treaty of
Hamina by Centrum Balticum and Town of Hamina together with the Finnish Prime Minister’s Office.
The author is grateful for their comments to Torbjörn Becker, Daumantas Lapinskas, Jean Pisani-Ferry,
Indhira Santos, André Sapir, Karsten Staehr, György Szapáry, Vilija Tauraitėand Jakob von Weizsäcker, to
the Hamina conference participants and to the seminar participants at the German Marshall Fund in Berlin.
The views expressed are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of persons mentioned. Maite
de Sola, Kristina Morkunaite and Juan Ignacio Aldasoro provided excellent research assistance. Bruegel
gratefully acknowledges the support of the German Marshall Fund of the United States to research
underpinning this policy contribution.
Telephone
+32 2 227 4210 
info@bruegel.org
www.bruegel.org 
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Euro area
THE BALTIC CHALLENGE AND EURO-AREA ENTRY Zsolt Darvas
02
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
THE BALTIC CHALLENGE AND EURO-AREA ENTRY
ZSOLT DARVAS,NOVEMBER 2009
1. INTRODUCTION
The global economic and financial crisis has hit
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania hard (Figure 1).
These countries became increasingly vulnerable
before the crisis – for example, they had huge
credit, housing and consumption booms and thus
high current-account deficits and external debt. It
was widely expected even before the crisis that
these vulnerabilities would have to be corrected
at some point, but the crisis amplified the
magnitude of the correction. For the 2008-2010
period, the three Baltic countries are projected to
experience the sharpest GDP contraction among
the 182 countries of the world for which forecasts
are available.
Figure 1: GDP growth, 1995-2010
Source: IMF, October 2009 World Economic Outlook.
The cornerstone of economic policy in the Baltic
countries has been the maintenance of the fixed
exchange-rate system. While many observers
advised and predicted devaluation, the three
countries have so far managed to survive under
their fixed exchange-rate strategy and have
engaged in drastic budget expenditure cuts,
including nominal wage cuts. Wages and prices
have also started to fall in the private sector, and
the previously huge current account imbalances
have been turned into surpluses. While the
adjustment in the economy has started, it is
having a severe social impact, and question
marks have remained about medium-term
economic growth. 
This paper aims to contribute to the analysis of the
policy choices of the Baltic countries. To this end,
we first discuss some aspects of the pre-crisis
economic boom in the Baltic countries, describe
some scenarios for future growth and consider the
issue of the recent current account surpluses. This
is followed by a discussion of policy options. As
the best option is euro entry, we revisit the issue
of euro-entry criteria, both from economic and
legal perspectives.
2. THE LEGACY OF THE PRE-CRISIS BOOM
In terms of the main macroeconomic conditions
that prevailed during their pre-crisis economic
growth phase, most central and eastern European
(CEE) countries were different from other
emerging countries in Asia and Latin America.
After the dramatic crises of the 1990s and around
the turn of the millennium, Asian and Latin
American countries fundamentally changed their
economic models. From being net capital
importers, they – especially in Asia – became
balanced, or even substantial capital exporters1.
Capital export from poorer to richer countries is
sometimes referred to  as capital moving ‘uphill’.
The CEE region was different: capital moved
‘downhill’, mostly from rich EU15 countries to
poorer CEE countries. The good economic growth
prospects and the low level of physical capital, the
prospect of eventual EU integration and the
related improvement in the business climate, the
generally highly-educated labour force and low
level of wages, and the low level of domestic credit
offering the potential for substantial credit
1. See, for example, Abiad,
Leigh and Mody (2009)
and Darvas and
Veugelers (2009).40
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expansion, were the main supply-side factors for
capital flows into CEE countries. These flows took
the form of foreign direct investment (including
the buying-up of swathes of the CEE banking
systems), portfolio investments and loans.
There were demand-side factors as well, which
were particularly strong in the three Baltic
countries. As these countries were on an
economic-growth path to catch up with the main
euro-area countries, their price levels were also
set to increase compared to the euro area. Figure
2 indicates that in countries with a higher level of
GDP per capita, the price level tends to be higher
as well, an observation which has both empirical
and theoretical underpinnings. The relationship is
not clearly one-to-one and there is country-
specific heterogeneity, but the relationship is
apparent. Figure 3 breaks down this dynamic
correspondence for each of the Baltic states.
Figure 3 (and other figures to be presented later)
also reports data for the other six Baltic Sea
countries, because for various reasons they
provide a convenient group of countries with
which to compare the three Baltic states.
Figure 2: GDP per capita and price levels in the EU
and Russia (euro area 12 = 100), 2007
Source: Bruegel’s calculations based on Eurostat and IMF
data. Note: Luxembourg is not shown due to its outlying
GDP/capita figure.
Price level increases compared to the main trading
partners can occur through either higher inflation
or nominal exchange-rate appreciation. Estonia
has had a fixed exchange rate against the euro
(and the Deutsche mark before) since it became
independent, and hence all price-level
convergence toward euro-area price levels took
* Source for Figure 3:
Bruegel’s calculation based
on data from Eurostat, the
IMF's October 2009 World
Economic Outlook forecast,
and ECB exchange-rate sta-
tistics. Note: For better
visual comparability across
countries the range of the
vertical axis is 50 percent-
age points in each panel.
The relative price levels for
2009 and 2010 were calcu-
lated using the IMF World
Economic Outlook’s infla-
tion forecast for the individ-
ual countries and the euro
area and our assumptions
on exchange rates against
the euro. Euro exchange
rates for 2009 and 2010
are annual averages and
were calculated from actual
exchange rates between 2
January 2009 and 11 Sep-
tember 2009 and an
assumed constant
exchange rate for the rest of
2009 and 2010. The
assumed constant
exchange rate is equal to
the average of actual
exchange rates between 3
August and 11 September
2009.
Figure 3: GDP per capita and price level (euro area 12 = 100), 1995-2010*
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the form of higher inflation. Latvia and Lithuania,
on the other hand, had pegs against the SDR (IMF
Special Drawing Rights) until 2004 and the US
dollar until 2002. As a result of the movements of
the euro against the dollar and SDR, Latvia and
Lithuania experienced nominal appreciation both
against the euro and in nominal effective terms
from 1999 to 2002 (Figure 4). Nominal
appreciation was especially marked in Lithuania
(about 50 percent), which contributed to
Lithuania having the lowest inflation rate among
the nine Baltic Sea countries in the first few years
of the 2000s, and even experiencing deflation in
2003 (Figure 5). However, once these countries
pegged their currencies to the euro, price-level
convergence with the euro area occurred through
higher inflation.
The fixed exchange-rate regime enjoyed high
credibility in all three countries because it
survived both the turbulent period of the first
years of transition in the first half of the 1990s
and the Russian crisis in 19982. The stability of
the exchange rate created an incentive to borrow
in foreign exchange, because the nominal interest
rates of euro loans were somewhat below local
currency loan rates. As inflation started to pick up
after 2004 (Figure 5) people and corporations
recognised that their wages and incomes, as well
as prices, were rising much faster than the
percentage cost of the loan, ie real interest rates
became negative. The negative real rate pushed
up demand for loans and amplified the boom.
Furthermore, rapid economic growth fuelled
2. Note however that the
effect of the Russian
crisis on these countries
is dwarfed by the
current crisis (see
Figure 1 and Figure 3).
Figure 4: Nominal effective exchange rates (4 Jan 1999=100), 4 Jan 1999 - 12 Oct 2009
Source: Bruegel’s calculation based on ECB, Datastream and Central Bank of Iceland data.
Note: Increases in the index indicate nominal appreciation. The nominal effective exchange rate was calculated against 52
trading partners. Weights were derived from average trade flows between 2000 and 2008.
Figure 5: Current account balance (% of GDP) and inflation (%), 2000-2010
Source: IMF - October 2009 World Economic Outlook.THE BALTIC CHALLENGE AND EURO-AREA ENTRY Zsolt Darvas
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expectations that high growth would continue,
encouraging people to borrow against their future
income, as depicted by intertemporal optimisation
models.
The role of budget policy in amplifying/dampening
the boom was different in the three countries.
According to our previous calculations (Darvas,
2009b) budget policy was highly pro-cyclical in
Latvia before the crisis, somewhat pro-cyclical in
Lithuania, but counter-cyclical in Estonia.
Consequently, both supply and demand factors
contributed to the emergence of substantial credit
booms that fostered construction booms, housing
booms, and consumption booms3. Budget policy
also amplified the boom, especially in Latvia, but
to a lesser extent in Lithuania. These factors
gradually overheated the economies and, in the
years immediately before the crisis, led to a sharp
rise in wages4, inflation and current account
deficits (Figure 5). Although considerable foreign
direct investment (FDI) flowed into the Baltic
countries, most of the current account deficit was
financed by borrowing from abroad. As a
consequence, massive external liabilities were
accumulated (Figure 6), of which the bulk was
private sector external debt. As the examples of
Poland and a few other new EU countries indicate,
such a development was not inherently
unavoidable. As also shown in Figure 5, Polish
external liabilities were much lower relative to GDP,
and exhibited a more favourable composition,
than in the Baltics5.
The risk inherent in private sector net external
debt did not matter before the crisis but matters
now for market-risk assessment. Figure 7
indicates that the credit default swap (CDS) on
government bonds – which is a measure of the
cost of insurance against government default – is
now related to countries' net external debt and
loan liabilities, which – at least in the three Baltic
states – are mainly made up of private sector debt
held in foreign currencies. Should the economic
outlook deteriorate further and/or the exchange
rate collapse (eg Baltics), or fall further (eg
Ukraine, Hungary), then even deeper economic
3. Ireland and Spain
experienced similar
developments after euro
entry in 1999 (though to a
much lesser extent than in
the Baltics), due to their
fast economic growth and
inflation rate above the
euro-area average, as the
low euro-area interest rate
boosted demand and
contributed to the pre-crisis
housing and construction
booms (see Ahearne,
Delgado, and von
Weizsäcker, 2008).
4. Migration to western
Europe and the shortage of
qualified workers have also
contributed to wage
increases.
5. Bulgaria has also had a
fixed exchange-rate
system, and has
experienced very similar
economic developments to
the Baltic countries before
the crisis, yet Bulgaria has
been much less affected by
the crisis. It would be
worthwhile studying in
detail what lies behind this.
Figure 6: External assets and liabilities (% of
GDP), 2000 and 2007
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crises could emerge, leading to more
bankruptcies, unmanageable bank losses and the
complete drying-up of foreign capital. These
factors may lead to a government default, despite
the low level of government debt (Darvas, 2009b).
In countries where foreign banks are prevalent,
burden-sharing is an issue. Plotting CDS against
government debt does not indicate a relationship,
suggesting that the current level of government
debt is not in itself a concern for fiscal
sustainability in eastern Europe. The risk inherent
in private sector debt matters more.
Figure 7: Cost of insurance against government
default and countries' net external debt
Source: Bruegel’s calculation based on Datastream and IMF
data. Note: Net foreign loan and debt liabilities refer to the
whole economy. CEE refers to new EU member states (except
Cyprus and Malta), plus Croatia, Russia, and Turkey. EU-15
refers to the 15 EU countries before 2004 (except
Luxembourg and Ireland). The Sept/Oct 2009 CDS values
were calculated from the average between 1 September and
12 October 2009.
Deceleration of credit growth already started
before the global financial and economic crisis but
it greatly amplified the correction and led to very
sharp drop in GDP with all the associated
consequences. The sharp fall in output opened a
wide gap between GDP per capita and price levels
(relative in both cases to the euro area, see Figure
3). Further, the exchange rates of some other main
trading partners depreciated, such as the Swedish
krona and the Polish zloty, which helped Sweden
and Poland at a time of great contraction in export
demand6. Indeed, Figure 4 shows that, in nominal
effective terms, the currencies of the three Baltic
countries appreciated by about five to ten percent
in late 2008, which incidentally is similar to what
happened in Germany, Denmark and Finland.
3. POST-CRISIS ECONOMIC GROWTH SCENARIOS
Figure 8 provides a schematic picture of actual
and potential output before and during the crisis,
and offers some scenarios for the future.
The overheated economy, as discussed in the
previous section, has led to faster actual output
growth than pre-crisis potential growth, and hence
the actual output level is now greater than
potential output (thus, point (1) is above point
(2) in Figure 8).
Figure 8: Schematic depiction of actual and
potential output scenarios in the Baltic states
Source: Bruegel.
Cerra and Saxena (2008) have demonstrated that
crises tend to generate a sizeable permanent loss
in the level of output compared with the pre-crisis
trend when all main country groups (ie advanced,
emerging market and developing countries) are
taken into account. Their findings imply that the
level of potential output in the Baltic countries is
likely to have fallen during the recent crisis (from
point (2) to point (3) in Figure 8).
Actual output should fall markedly between 2008
and 2010 in the Baltic countries (from point (1) to
point (4) in Figure 8), while domestic demand
should contract even more sharply. The actual output
fall can be decomposed into three components:
6. The Polish zloty
depreciated by about 45
percent between the
summer of 2008 and
early 2009, but a proper
evaluation of this
movement implies
looking at what
happened before. Figure
4 indicates that the
zloty was at record
highs in the summer of
2008 and the current
level of the exchange
rate at the time of
writing this contribution
is quite close to the
average of the past
decade. Figure 3
suggests that the zloty
may have been
overvalued before the
crisis (note that the
2008 price level was
calculated using the
average exchange rate
of the full year, ie
without the huge
depreciation in the
fourth quarter, the price
level would have been
much higher) and also
that the current
magnitude of the real
depreciation was
broadly reasonable,
because the price levels
and GDP per capita
(both relative to the
euro area) converged.THE BALTIC CHALLENGE AND EURO-AREA ENTRY Zsolt Darvas
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• Part of the contraction is a correction of
previous excess demand (the difference
between points (1) and (2) in Figure 8);
• Part of the contraction corresponds to the fall
in potential output (the difference between
points (2) and (3) in Figure 8);
• But it is also likely that actual output falls below
potential GDP (the difference between points
(3) and (4) in Figure 8), ie the output gap
becomes negative.
While theories of business cycle fluctuations may
need to be reconsidered in the light of the findings
of Cerra and Saxena (2008), available theories
offer a propagation mechanism in which a
recession can lead to negative output gaps.
Empirical evidence also suggests that recessions
typically result in negative output gaps.
Furthermore, financial frictions, such as a sudden
stopping of capital inflows and a change in the
lending behaviour of banks, are likely to have
constrained the real economy. This is a further
reason why the crisis is resulting in a negative
output gap in Baltic countries.
An inconvenient implication of the fall in output is
that price levels become too high compared to
actual GDP per capita (Figure 3), but probably also
relative to potential GDP per capita. The price level
became too high in the Baltic countries, both
relative to its historic level, and when
benchmarked against a global comparison. In
other words, the real exchange rates are highly
overvalued. While this observation holds for all
three countries, Latvia clearly stands out with its
GDP per capita standing at 42 percent of the euro-
area average, and its price level at 69 percent of
the euro-area average (both forecast for 2010, as
highlighted by Figure 3).
The future scenarios depicted in Figure 8 are
highly uncertain. A good outcome would be
Scenario A, ie a return to the previous potential
growth rate, starting from the reduced level. Under
this scenario, actual output would grow rapidly for
a short period until it reaches the potential level
of output, and then would continue to grow at the
same rate as potential output.
Scenario B would be a no-growth scenario. One
cannot exclude the possibility of no potential
growth with a highly overvalued exchange rate.
Still, actual output may increase in the short run
as it converges to the potential level of output by
closing the negative output gap. 
Obviously, many other scenarios can be
envisaged. The rate of potential growth for the pre-
crisis period is not known (available estimates are
so uncertain as to be practically useless) and
hence, in the optimistic Scenario A, it is highly
uncertain if future potential growth will be equal
to previous potential growth or will be
higher/lower. Also, Scenario B may be replaced by
scenarios in which potential output grows, but
very slowly, or potential output falls.
4. HOW TO EVALUATE RECENT CURRENT ACCOUNT
SURPLUSES
Figure 5 showed that the previous high current-
account deficits had already been adjusted by
2009 and all three Baltic countries are expected
to have current-account surpluses in 2009 and
2010. One may argue that current-account
surpluses remove the need for further relative
price adjustment (ie devaluation of the currency
or ‘internal devaluation’, which amounts to
domestic wage and price falls). However, this
claim crucially depends on the fundamental
drivers behind this adjustment and its
sustainability. We list three possible explanations. 
1. Financing constraints. One possible explan-
ation of the current-account adjustment is the
sudden stop of capital inflows, ie the lack of
‘The sharp fall in output opened a wide gap between GDP per capita and price levels (relative
to the euro area) both taking a historical view considering the Baltic countries themselves
and  taking a global comparison.’‘The recent export performance of the Baltic states is at least not worse than in the other
Baltic Sea countries and other EU member states, which is to some extent encouraging.’
THE BALTIC CHALLENGE AND EURO-AREA ENTRY Zsolt Darvas
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financing. In this case, domestic agents have
no choice but to cut imports, and the
adjustment does not invalidate the need for a
significant relative price adjustment, ie the
economy may be uncompetitive and an
adjustment in relative prices would still be
required for economic recovery and for
sustaining the adjustment in the current
account. A continued lack of financing of the
current account imbalance coupled with
insufficient adjustment in relative prices may
not allow the output gap to turn to zero, with the
risk of a scenario where actual output is lower
than in Scenario B in Figure 8.
2. Negative output gap. A negative output gap7
(eg idle capacity and unemployment) induces
domestic agents to voluntarily postpone
imports due to uncertainty about economic
prospects. Again, such a case would not remove
the need for relative price adjustment.
Whenever the output gap moves toward zero,
the current-account imbalance will emerge
provided that there is a source of financing.
3. Disappearance of unsustainable consumption
and investment booms. A third possible
explanation is that Baltic countries did not have
a competitiveness problem, even in the boom
years before the crisis, and the huge current
account deficit was merely the consequence of
an unsustainable consumption boom, fuelled
also by intertemporal optimisation (ie agents
expecting higher future income and borrowing
now against that future income). Unsustainable
investment booms (concerning investment in
eg the real estate sector) may have also
contributed to the build-up of pre-crisis current-
account deficits. With the huge recession,
consumption has adjusted partly because of
cloudier future growth expectations. The
unsustainable component of investment has
also adjusted because of the emergence of
overcapacity in the construction sector, and
property price falls and their future outlook.
Under these circumstances the adjustment
achieved so far in the current account is broadly
sustainable and a return to more normal growth
without excessive consumption and investment
booms will lead to the emergence of ‘reasonable’
current account balances.
The three explanations8 have different impli-
cations for the need for further adjustment. If the
competitiveness  problem is serious, then a
significant adjustment in relative prices is needed,
despite the recently-achieved current-account
surplus. If competitiveness problems are minor,
then relative price adjustment may not be needed,
but the government budget would need to be
adjusted (public sector wage cuts, expenditure
cuts, revenue increases) to keep budget
expenditures in line with new revenue realities.
While all three explanations may have played a
role (to different degrees in the three countries),
it is difficult to identify one of them as dominant.
The recent export performance of the Baltic states
is at least not worse than in the other Baltic Sea
countries and other EU member states, which is
to some extent encouraging (Figure 9). The
broadly similar export performance was
accompanied by much sharper output falls in the
Baltic countries. This implies that the sharp output
contraction in the Baltic countries was attributable
mostly to sectors producing for domestic sales,
and export capacity may have not been affected
more than in other countries. Looking at imports,
all three Baltic countries indicate a sharper fall
than the other countries under consideration. The
fall in imports is consistent with all three possible
explanations of the recent current-account
surpluses described above.
However, there are at least three reasons that
suggest that regaining competitiveness is crucial
even if the third explanation given above provides
the main explanation for the previous high current-
7. A negative output gap
can also be of course
the consequence of
financing constraints.
8. A small part of the
improvement in the
current account balance
is due to less
transferring of profit.THE BALTIC CHALLENGE AND EURO-AREA ENTRY Zsolt Darvas
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Figure 9: Volume of export and import of goods and services (2007Q1=100, seasonally adjusted),
2005Q1-2009Q2
Figure 10: Unit labour costs in different sectors of the economy, 2000Q1=100, 2000Q1-2009Q1
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account deficits and the recent surpluses (though
this is unlikely in our view).
First, the fact that wages also increased much
more quickly than productivity during the boom
years suggests that the overheated economy may
also have gradually eroded competitiveness.
Among the different sectors of the economy, unit
labour cost (ULC) increases were mostly
concentrated in the non-tradable sectors in
Lithuania, as highlighted by Kuodis and
Ramanauskas (2009), a finding that also applies
to the other two Baltic countries. However, ULC has
also increased sharply in the manufacturing
sector as indicated in Figure 10, especially since
2005. The international comparison offered by the
figure highlights that the Baltic countries lost
during the pre-crisis boom a significant degree of
competitiveness in manufacturing compared to
the other countries shown9.
Second, the non-tradable sector has developed
especially rapidly during the boom years. Without
restoring competitiveness it would be difficult to
direct capacities from this sector towards the
tradable sector.
Third, Figure 3 has already indicated that a wide
gap has opened between GDP per capita and price
levels compared to the euro area. In other words,
the actual exchange rate compared to the
purchasing power parity exchange rate, adjusted
by the Balassa-Samuelson effect, has become
highly overvalued. In order to provide a historical,
cross-country overview of what used to happen
with the price level after large drops in GDP, we
have looked at all episodes among 182 countries
of the world between 1950 and 2007 in which
GDP per capita has fallen by at least 10 percent
within a period of two years compared to the
weighted average of 22 industrialised countries.
We have selected countries with relative GDP per
capita levels between 20 and 100 percent in the
starting year and have excluded transition
economies and oil-exporting countries. Figure 11
indicates that such episodes also tend to be
followed by price level drops. On average, price
levels fell somewhat sluggishly, but five years
after the start of the depression, the price level
decline (19 percent) almost equalled the decline
in GDP per capita (18 percent); both are relative
to the weighted average of 22 industrialised
countries.
Figure 11: GDP per capita and price levels after
big drops in GDP (compared to the weighted
average 22 industrialised countries)
Source: Bruegel’s calculations using IMF and World Bank data.
Note: The data shown refers to 43 episodes in 35 countries
between 1950 and 2007 in which GDP per capita at PPP
declined by at least 10 percent compared to the weighted
average of 22 industrialised countries with a period of two years
(country specific weights were derived from Bayoumi, Lee and
Jayanthi, 2006). Only countries with GDP per capita between
20 and 100 percent (in the starting year) are considered, and
transition countries and major oil-exporting countries were
excluded. The line with the symbols shows the mean of the 43
episodes, while the two dashed lines indicate the interquartile
range (ie the middle 50 percent of the distribution). Time ‘t’ is
the year which precedes the drop in GDP.
5. BALTIC OPTIONS
The cornerstone of the economic policy of Baltic
countries has been the maintenance of the fixed
exchange rate and the goal of euro entry as soon
as possible. There is continued strong political
9. Note that all countries
except Poland and
Sweden had an
exchange rate fixed to
their main trading
partners. The Polish and
Swedish currencies
showed in some cases
large variations during
the sample period
shown, but did not have
any trend in exchange
rate movement (Figure
4). Consequently, a
comparison of nominal
ULC data shown on
Figure 10 well reflects
changes in
competitiveness among
the nine countries.THE BALTIC CHALLENGE AND EURO-AREA ENTRY Zsolt Darvas
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support for this policy, but it has become the
subject of intense discussion. 
The Baltic countries face three main choices, and
we shall argue that none of these choices clearly
stands out as the best, as all have advantages and
disadvantages, and pose serious risks. There is a
fourth option, which would clearly be the best, but
it is not within the power of the Baltic countries to
adopt. The policy choice of the authorities and the
success in implementing their choice will
doubtless have an effect on which of the
scenarios shown in Figure 8 will occur. The four
options are the following:
• Option 1:Preservation of the current exchange
rate level and best endeavours to introduce the
euro as soon as possible;
• Option 2:Devaluation, but maintenance of the
fixed exchange rate system;
• Option 3: Introduction of a floating exchange
rate;
• Option 4: Immediate euro introduction at a
suitable exchange rate, supported by
appropriate resolution to manage the debt
overhang.
Option 1: Preservation of the current exchange
rate level and best endeavours to introduce the
euro as soon as possible10
The three Baltic countries have continued to
pursue this option, though with different time
horizons for euro introduction. Policymakers in all
three countries have expressed their aim of
introducing the euro as soon as possible, but
Estonians seem to be the most ambitious with a
target date of 2011, implying that their application
for euro-zone membership will be assessed in
spring 2010. 
There is a clear rationale for choosing this option.
With very high foreign currency debt, devaluation
would pose many risks, as we shall discuss under
Option 2. The Baltic countries have reasonably
flexible economies and adjustment through
cutting wages and prices could be a solution. More
generally, having a fixed exchange rate without
introducing the euro implies giving-up monetary
policy without enjoying the benefits of the
common currency, including the access to ECB
facilities. An independent currency in a very small
and open economy is a source of risk. It is also
sometimes highlighted that keeping the fixed
exchange rate, which has survived both the
turbulent years after independence in the early
1990s and the Russian crisis, is an important
pillar of national pride.
Private sector competitiveness needs to be
improved, but the government also has a major
role in the adjustment. All three countries have
announced substantial public sector wage cuts,
and other expenditure and revenue measures to
contain the budget deficit. 
This strategy implies many risks. The first is
whether sufficient adjustment in wages and
prices could be achieved or not. Figure 12 on the
next page shows data on average monthly
nominal wages in local currency. In all three
countries public sector wages declined somewhat
in the first half of 2009, but to a much lesser
extent than announced (about 15, 40, and 25
percent in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania,
respectively). The reason for the discrepancy
could be the time required to implement the wage
cuts, but it needs to be seen if nominal wages will
fall in the public sector, as announced, and if
private sector wages and prices will follow. The
good news for the adjustment is that nominal
wages in the private sector have also started to
decline (Figure 12); thought the actual magnitude
is still quite small.
The second key risk is caused by the uncertain
economic environment until a definitive solution
is found. Although all three Baltic countries have
ruled out devaluation, markets are not fully
convinced (Figure 7). As long as investors think a
country may devalue in the near future, they will
not invest, delaying real activity and contributing
to the downward spiral.
Third, while the choice is not between devaluation
and budget consolidation, because budget
consolidation would anyway be needed to keep
10. In principle an
additional option would be
to keep the peg at the
current level but not rush
for euro-area entry; instead,
use fiscal policy to dampen
the economic and social
impacts of the crisis and
target euro-area entry only
after the crisis. While this
policy would ease the short
run adjustment needed by
government and may
indeed dampen the short
run social impact of the
crisis, a prolonged period of
uncertainty until euro-area
entry would be detrimental
for investment, and the
many risks discussed for
Option 1 would remain.
Furthermore, the ability of
fiscal policy to boost
domestic production is
limited in small, open
economies.THE BALTIC CHALLENGE AND EURO-AREA ENTRY Zsolt Darvas
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expenditures in line with new medium term
revenue realities (Darvas 2009b), the
consolidation requirement is certainly greater if
the fixed exchange rate is to be maintained.
Clearly, budget consolidation at a time of sharp
recession strongly amplifies the recession and
the social burden of the crisis. Latvia had to take
especially drastic measures by cutting public
expenditures by about 40 percent in 2009 and
further cuts are required in 2010 in order to fulfill
the obligations of the EU- and IMF-led international
lending programme. Apart from the direct
consequences of cutting all expenditure (other
than interest payments and international
obligations) by a substantial amount, social
unrest may bring down the government, and
consequently the international lending
programme, leading to unforeseeable
consequences.  
Fourth, the fall in nominal incomes (both among
those who continue to be employed and those
who have recently become unemployed) will
increase the share of non-performing and
defaulting loans. The length of the period of
increasing bank losses is uncertain but it will
probably be considerable, implying that banks will
be very cautious in their lending for a prolonged
period, thus lengthening the recession (cf.
Scenario B in Figure 8). A lengthened recession
and the uncertainties about its duration will also
lead to postponement of investment decisions, so
keeping the economies in a downward spiral. 
Fifth, the lengthened recession will make it more
difficult for governments to meet the euro-area
entry criterion on the budget deficit. Nor can it be
taken for granted that the inflation criterion will be
met, though the recession, the overvaluation of
the exchange rate and the nominal wage cuts will
certainly contain inflationary pressures and will
probably even drive the economy into deflation.
The sixth risk comes from the unpredictable
reaction of European institutions to the inflation
sustainability criterion. The protocol annexed to
the treaty requires among other things that “...a
Member State has a price performance that is
sustainable...”. Indeed, in the rejection of
Lithuania’s 2006 euro-area application the
sustainability criterion may have played a role11.
Even if the Baltic countries will meet all
(backward-looking) criteria, what if the
Commission and the ECB do not regard the
situation as sustainable and instead argue that
the achievement of low inflation was the
extraordinary consequence of the deep
recession?
Even if the Baltic countries manage to adopt the
euro in the near future, there will be significant
risks and challenges for the medium and long run.
There is no doubt that having the euro (converted
at the current exchange rate) would be better for
growth than the current situation where there is
exchange-rate risk and associated uncertainty in
the business environment. Introduction of the
euro may increase the attractiveness of the
countries and hence could lead to higher inward
investment. However, the large private sector debt
11. As we have shown in
Figure 4, Lithuania’s
nominal effective
appreciation between
1999 and 2004 was
sizeable, which
contributed to low
inflation in the first half
of the 2000s. Further
nominal appreciation
was not expected.
Figure 12: Average monthly nominal wages in the three Baltic countries (in local currency)
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and the lower capacity to service the debt will
remain even after euro-area entry. If the
adjustment in nominal wages and prices proves
inadequate and the exchange rate remains
overvalued, then Scenario B of Figure 8 may
materialise. These outcomes are not just
detrimental in their own right, but may lead to
accelerated migration out of the Baltic countries
to EU15 countries once the recession is over in the
EU15, which would further undermine the growth
prospects of the Baltic countries (Ahearne,
Brücker, Darvas and von Weizsäcker, 2009).
The case of Portugal also provides a warning
signal: following a prosperous economic catching-
up period before euro-area entry in 1999, which
was accompanied by credit, housing and
construction booms and the build up of large
current-account deficits and external debt,
Portugal had the slowest growth rate among euro-
area countries, and the catching-up process
halted and even went into reverse to some extent
(Blanchard, 2006). Spain and Ireland continued
to grow fast after euro-area entry, but are now
facing the most serious recessions among euro-
area members.
Option 2: Devaluation, but maintenance of the
fixed exchange rate system12
Whenever restoring competitiveness and
diversion of resources from the non-tradable
sector to the tradable sector requires a significant
relative price change, exchange rate devaluation
or wage and price cuts could both do the job. The
most important argument in favour of devaluation
is that a large correction in relative prices is
needed and it is much easier to do that with an
external than with an internal devaluation.
Deflation is more difficult to achieve and to
manage and also requires more time than
devaluation. As devaluation is quicker, it can give
rise to a recovery sooner than the wage and price
cut strategy. There will be bankruptcies both when
the adjustment is carried out by devaluation and
by cutting wages and prices. Devaluation would
mostly hurt those who have foreign currency
loans, while wage and price cuts hurt everyone
(Becker, 2009). Furthermore, although markets
have stabilised somewhat at the time of writing
this policy contribution, there is a risk that the
social costs of budgetary cuts and wage
reductions will be unbearable, or that markets will
anyway enforce devaluation later. A voluntarily
and properly designed devaluation is clearly
preferable to a market- or social unrest-enforced
devaluation, because the latter will most likely
result in an exchange rate overshoot with further
devastating consequences, as many previous
crises have demonstrated.
The key arguments against devaluation are that it
would bring about bankruptcies earlier because of
the balance sheet effect of foreign exchange
loans, while deflation would provide some time to
adjust for all concerned. External financing needs
may not be reduced, because private sector
rollover rates might not improve, as the external
debt-to-GDP ratio would increase (IMF, 2009a). A
further risk relates to the reaction of foreign banks
(mostly Swedish and other Nordic banks) to a
large number of simultaneous defaults: banks
may decide to withdraw from the Baltic countries,
which would further undermine economic
recovery. Furthermore, devaluation would create
a precedent because the official fixed rates have
never been devalued since these countries gained
independence after transition. But devaluation
may induce markets and local people to expect
further devaluations and to speculate accordingly,
including possible runs on banks and conversion
of domestic currency deposits into foreign
currency deposits (Levy-Yeyati, 2009).
Whether a significant change in relative prices is
still needed is also not fully obvious. We have
shown that current accounts have gone into
surplus (Figure 5), and we have discussed in the
preceding section three possible mechanisms
12. A milder form of this
option is the use of the full
+/-15 percent wide ERM2
band (instead of the current
policy of keeping the rate in
the middle of the band),
which would be likely to
lead to depreciation to the
weak edge of the band.THE BALTIC CHALLENGE AND EURO-AREA ENTRY Zsolt Darvas
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leading to this outcome, one of which does not
point towards the need for adjustment. Further,
the three Baltic countries are probably different
regarding the required size of relative price
adjustment as suggested by eg Figure 3 and 10.
Furthermore, for Estonia, IMF (2009b) concludes:
“Staff’s assessment is that the real effective
exchange rate is somewhat overvalued, but that
competitiveness is projected to remain adequate
as real wage increases are aligned with
productivity. Structural policies to ensure market
flexibility considered to be crucial for facilitating
real adjustment including a reallocation of
resources from the non-traded to the tradable
sector and from low wage to high-value added
activities.” Such a more-or-less positive assess-
ment cannot be found in eg IMF documents
dealing with Latvia.
An additional risk to neighbouring countries is that
if only one (or two) of these countries were to opt
for an uncoordinated devaluation, spillover effects
may necessitate a disorderly devaluation in the
other country(ies).
Option 3: Introduction of a floating exchange rate
Some CEE countries adopted a floating exchange
rate rather successfully. The Czech Republic, for
example, achieved high growth, low inflation,
below-euro-area interest rates before the crisis,
and foreign currency loans had practically no
share in household loans and made up a very low
share of loans to corporations. Poland and
Slovakia also adopted the floating exchange rate
quite successfully and these countries are
weathering the storm now much better than the
Baltic countries13.
After many years with a fixed exchange rate,
Ukraine opted for a floating rate in November 2008
in response to the crisis. The exchange rate of the
hrivna depreciated by about 40 percent in a few
months (helping the relative price adjustment but
hurting borrowers with foreign exchange loans)
and was volatile, but it has achieved a remarkable
degree of stability since spring 2009. 
With the benefit of hindsight, in the Baltic
countries the introduction of a floating exchange
rate would have been a good option around 2000,
ie some time after the Russian crisis but before
the huge credit boom started. The floating rate
would have disciplined borrowers and the credit
boom would probably have been milder, similarly
to other floating rate CEE countries. However, there
is always a fear that, in very small and very open
economies, a floating exchange rate may lead to
excessive exchange rate volatility that could be
detrimental to investment and growth. The key
question, which at this point has only historical
relevance, is if the huge boom and bust cycle and
all associated consequences caused by the fixed
exchange rate or potential exchange rate volatility
would have been more detrimental to social
welfare in a longer term perspective.
However, moving to a floating rate at the time of
panic in a small country with very high external
debt risks excessive depreciation of the exchange
rate, and consequently many of the dangers
associated with devaluation discussed so far
would come into play with greater force14.
The above arguments suggest that the choice is
very hard and there is no clear-cut winner among
the options. However, there is a further option,
which is not at the disposal of the Baltic countries
themselves, but could be implemented via EU-
wide coordination and agreement.
Option 4: ‘Immediate’ euro introduction at a
suitable exchange rate supported by appropriate
resolution to manage the debt overhang15
This option would combine the benefits of the
other options, eliminate most of their risks and
speed up and help sustain the recovery.
13. See Darvas and Szapáry
(2008) for a detailed
analysis of the
experiences with
floating exchange rates
in new EU member
states and the
comparison of their
economic performance
to fixed exchange rate
countries.
14. Still, some observers
argue for a floating rate
especially because it
would be likely to lead to
an overshooting of the
exchange rate and
hence may create
attractive investment
opportunities for foreign
investors, thereby
helping the recovery and
medium term growth
(see RGE Monitor 2009).
‘The choice is very hard and there is no clear-cut winner among the options facing the Baltic
countries. However, there is a further option: immediate euro introduction at a suitable
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Why euro introduction? The dilemma around the
overvalued exchange rate and the large stock of
foreign currency loans cannot be solved properly
by any of the options discussed so far. While euro
adoption itself is not a solution to the dilemma, a
comprehensive package also including the selec-
tion of the suitable exchange rate and resolution of
the private debt overhang would solve it. It is better
to design a comprehensive package than to dis-
cuss the individual elements of it. More
fundamentally, having an independent currency in
a very small and open economy is a source of risk
and keeping the rate fixed may not be a viable
option under free capital mobility. The credibility
and stability brought by the euro would benefit
investment and growth. The euro proved to be a
shelter during the crisis and crises may occur in
the future. Euro-area members have scope to run
counter-cyclical fiscal policy during a crisis. Euro
introduction at the earliest possible date has been
the cornerstone of the economic policy of the Baltic
countries and, in any case, all new EU entrants are
obliged to introduce the euro at some point.
Why ‘immediate’?The Baltic situation, especially
in Latvia, is getting more and more dramatic.
While Baltic governments and central banks are
making every effort to survive with the peg, there
is a risk of failure. Eventual collapse in one country
may trigger a collapse in the other two. A Baltic
collapse is not in the interest of the EU as whole. Of
course, euro introduction cannot be done
‘immediately’ and any action has to respect the
treaty of the EU and all other international laws.
However, with a unanimous decision of the Council
appropriate provisions can be put in place to
strengthen the economic foundations of the euro-
accession criteria, which would increase the
credibility of the euro adoption plan and speed up
the convergence. In the next sections we discuss
the economic and legal aspects of this reform.
Why at a ‘suitable’ exchange rate and what does
this term mean? Introducing the euro at an
overvalued exchange rate risks Scenario B of
Figure 8. Defining the appropriate final conversion
rate is a difficult task. The evidence we have
provided so far indicates that the exchange rate is
highly overvalued, especially in Latvia, but also in
Estonia and Lithuania. The wage and price falls
that have already started are helping to restore
competitiveness, but it is questionable how far
this process can go. We do not take a stand on the
level of the appropriate conversion rate as its
determination should be based on detailed
calculations considering a large number of factors.
The issue of the appropriate conversion rate
should be carefully discussed on economic
grounds by European and national authorities.
Under what conditions? Euro-area entry
conditions are laid down in the treaty. However,
the economic rationale behind the criteria was
doubtful even before the crisis – but has been
especially so during the crisis. We shall argue in
the next section that keeping the criteria
unchanged violates in the economic sense the
equal treatment principle. The entry criteria should
be reviewed and fine tuned within the legal
framework of the treaty and only countries that
meet the reviewed criteria should be allowed to
join the euro area. Any solution should not be
Baltic-specific but should be equally applicable to
any EU country. Any solution should not incur
moral hazard, ie should not encourage private
sector actors and governments to count on ‘cheap’
future help in crises.
Why and what kind of resolution of private debt
overhang? It is obvious that there will be
significant bank losses even if parity is
maintained or changed, whether or not the euro is
introduced. Neither the people (through indirect
channels including those who do not have loans)
and governments of the Baltic countries, nor the
governments of the home countries of the banks
active in the region, are immune to the
consequences of bank losses. The recent
unilateral announcement of the Latvian
government regarding a possible new bill to
retroactively intervene in existing mortgage
contracts16 underlines that the country may not
be able to solve its problem itself and that the
situation may escalate. A potentially escalating
situation would disad-vantage all parties
concerned. Consequently, appropriate resolution
15. For Latvia, IMF (2009a)
argued for immediate euro
adoption possibly at the
weak edge of the +/- 15
percent exchange rate
band, but noted that the EU
authorities have ruled out
this option. Becker (2009)
has also argued in favour of
immediate euro adoption at
a devalued exchange rate.
Levy-Yeyati (2009) would
also favour this option, but
acknowledging that it would
not get EU-wide support he
proposes a contained
devaluation. Nouriel Roubini
suggested depreciating the
currency, euroise after
depreciation, restructure
private foreign currency
liabilities without a formal
'default', and boost the IMF
plan to limit the financial
fallout (see RGE Monitor
2009). For the other two
Baltic countries such direct
suggestions are rarer.
Åslund (2009), on the other
hand, opposes devaluation
in Latvia and lists six ways
in which Latvia differs from
Argentina and hence why it
is unlikely that Latvia’s
fixed exchange rate regime
will experience a collapse
similar to the collapse of
the Argentine fixed
exchange rate regime in
2001/2002.25
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schemes should be put in place (see the thorough
discussion of this issue in Mitra, Selowsky and
Zalduendo, 2009). However, the cross-border
ownership of banks re-quires cross-border
participation in the design of the resolution
schemes; in the extreme case a multilateral
burden-sharing agreement should also not be
excluded, though negotiations for it can be
extremely intricate in legal, political and economic
terms. The requirement for not incurring moral
hazard is especially critical in designing any
resolution scheme.
In the next section we briefly discuss the
economic rationale behind the review of the euro-
area accession criteria, which will be followed by
an analysis of the legal options under the treaty.
6. PROPOSAL TO REVIEW THE EURO AREA ENTRY
CRITERIA17
Even before the crisis, much discussion took place
about euro-area entry rules, but a lot more has
taken place in the wake of the crisis. Euro-area
entry criteria were established in the early 1990s
before the euro area existed and when the EU had
12 member states. Intense discussion preceded
the drawing up of the rules, and the end result was
a compromise between economics, politics and
simplicity. Now the euro area exists and there are
27 members of the EU, but the rules remain the
same. It is easy to show that keeping the same
rules in an expanded EU violates in the economic
sense the equal treatment principle – new
applicants have to meet tougher criteria than
previous ones because two of the criteria are
benchmarked on the “three best-performing
member states of the EU in terms of price stability”,
which have been interpreted in a special way. The
treaty does not specify how to determine the “three
best performers” (see the next section); in practice
this been defined as the three EU countries having
the lowest non-negative inflation rates. Lewis and
Staehr (forthcoming) found that according to this
interpretation the expansion of the EU from 15 to 27
members reduces the expected inflation reference
value by 0.15-0.2 percentage points, and there is a
considerable probability of a larger reduction.
Another long-known factor is the significant price-
level convergence of the new EU member states
due to their economic catch-up (the so-called
‘Balassa-Samuelson effect’), which results in
higher inflation if the exchange rate is to be kept
stable. Such inflation is structural and not a
reflection of unsustainable policies. While this
effect was present in some current euro-area
member countries, the effect is much stronger in
the new EU member states and hence it is much
harder for them to meet the inflation criterion than
it was for earlier applicants, unless they revalue
the exchange rate as Slovakia did (Figure 13).
However, continuous appreciation of the currency,
while not against the letter of the treaty, questions
the usefulness of the exchange-rate criterion, as
its rationale must have been to demonstrate that
a country can live with exchange-rate stability.
Figure 13: The Slovak koruna against the euro
and the ERM-II band, 1999-2008
Source: ECB. Note: A decrease in the exchange rate indicates
appreciation of the koruna against the euro. The red line
indicates the central parity and the two green lines indicate
the edges of the exchange rate band. The width of the
exchange rate band was +/-15 percent.
A further long-known factor regarding the inflation
criterion (as well as the interest-rate criterion) is
that it is benchmarked against all EU countries.
While this was a perfectly natural idea before the
euro existed, it has become rather questionable.
The inflation rates of those EU countries that are
not euro-area members may be affected by large
exchange-rate swings.
Nevertheless, before the crisis and in the first few
16. According to new reports
the proposed legislation
(which is incidentally
strongly opposed by the
Bank of Latvia) is
supposed to have two
key pillars: (1) limiting
mortgage lenders’
liability to the value of
the collateral instead of
the size of the loan and
(2) requiring that a bank
can repossess a
property in case of
default only if it provides
an alternative home to
the debtor with the
debtor's agreement. In
our view retroactive
introduction of this
legislation is clearly
contrary to international
law and hence cannot be
implemented. Raising
the issue strongly
undermines the trust in
the enforceability of
contracts and the rule of
law in general, which
may have devastating
future consequences for
investments in Latvia.
17. Most economic
arguments in this
section first appeared in
Darvas (2009a).0
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months of it, we shared the view that not all
criteria should be reviewed, restricting ourselves
to advocating a change to the misguided
interpretation of the inflation criterion mentioned
above (Darvas and Szapáry, 2008; Darvas,
2008). Also, four new EU member states have so
far managed to join the euro area. However, in
three of the four cases there was no need for
substantial price-level convergence and the fourth
case, Slovakia, could only manage it with the
substantial nominal exchange-rate appreciation
(Figure 13) discussed above.
The crisis has prompted a rethink of many
positions, and we ought to rethink the euro-area
entry criteria too, because serious asymmetry
exists and serious issues are at stake.
Figure 14: Percent of euro-area member states
missing the entry criteria, 1995-2010
Source: Bruegel’s calculation based on data from Eurostat
and the IMF's October 2009 World Economic Outlook. Note:
The percentages are calculated from the actual euro-area
member states in each year (and the first eleven members
before 1999): from 1995 to 2000 the 11 countries that
introduced the euro in 1999; in 2001 Greece is added as the
12th country; in 2007 Slovenia is added as the 13th country;
in 2008 Cyprus and Malta are added as the 14th-15th
countries; for 2009-2010 Slovakia is added as the 16th
country. Definition of meeting the general government debt
criterion: a country is considered to meet the criterion if either
the debt/GDP ratio is below 60 percent or, if above, then
projecting the average change in debt/GDP ratio of the latest
three years twenty years ahead will lead to a ratio below 60
percent. Three percent is used for the budget deficit criterion.
The three EU countries (considering the actual members of
the EU of the given year) with the lowest (but non-negative)
inflation rate were used to determine the inflation and
interest rate criteria.
Asymmetry. Once a country is inside the euro
area, it can do almost anything it likes. The
Stability and Growth Pact in principle limits the
scope of government action inside the euro area,
but not much, as many examples show, both in
the pre-crisis period but especially during the
crisis. Figure 14 shows that 50-60 percent of
euro-area member countries have violated at least
one entry criterion between 1999 and 200818. In
response to the crisis, government deficits and
debt are ballooning in euro-area countries, but
countries wishing to join are subjected to
extremely tough and painful measures if they are,
in a few years, to be considered eligible. 
The countries that have joined the euro area were
judged to have achieved a “high degree of
sustainable convergence”. The large number of
violations after euro-area entry suggests that the
criteria are inadequate for judging ‘sustainable
convergence’. This fundamentally calls into
question both the economic and moral
foundations of the future application of the
current entry criteria.
The asymmetry also highlights that the capacity
to meet the current entry criteria depends on the
business cycle, which is a highly unfavourable
property. Suppose, for example, that Slovakia
applies for euro-area membership a year later and
hence is evaluated in the spring/summer of 2009
instead of the spring/summer of 2008. Slovakia
would have been rejected in 2009 because of the
general government balance criterion, though
fiscal policy has not become ‘irresponsible’
between 2008 and 2009. Also, like all regional
floating currencies, the Polish zloty, the Czech
koruna, the Hungarian forint and the Romanian leu
experienced serious pressures and significantly
depreciated against the euro between the
summer of 2008 and the spring of 2009, and the
Slovakian koruna may also have come under
pressure at that time without a sure prospect of
euro-area entry. This in turn may have qualified it
for “severe tensions”status according to the letter
of the treaty, putting the evaluation of the
exchange-rate criterion at risk, and the tensions
may have increased government bond yields,
18. The entry criterion for
government budget
positions is the absence of
an excessive deficit
procedure, as we will
discuss in the next section.
Calculations behind the
figure assume a pragmatic
definition of the
government debt criteria
(see details in the note to
the figure) and use the
three percent deficit
benchmark. The figure is
based on currently
available data – at the time
of evaluation, real time data
was used; this has been
revised in some cases.THE BALTIC CHALLENGE AND EURO-AREA ENTRY Zsolt Darvas
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putting the fulfilment of that criterion at risk as
well.
Business cycle dependence is the result of the
fact that the two budgetary criteria (deficit and
debt) are phrased in absolute terms (the inflation
and interest rate are phrased in relative terms).
Business cycle dependence implies that most
countries can join only in good times19, which
does not make much sense: meeting the criteria in
good times obviously does not tell one much
about long term sustainability, as Figure 14 has
also shown.
High stakes.One may say that the new applicants
should have pursued policies similar to those of
the four newest euro members. However, the
stakes are much higher now than just naming and
shaming. As we have discussed, the three Baltic
countries are in deep trouble and the current
misery is not only their own fault. A Baltic
exchange-rate peg failure or a prolonged recession
and a halted economic catch-up would not just
cause further pain for the populations of these
countries. It could undermine trust in the notion
of common European values, and lead to a new
divide within Europe (Darvas and Pisani-Ferry,
2008). Western European investors in the Baltic
countries would also suffer heavy losses. If the
Baltic countries do not recover, this will impact the
EU’s role as driver of reform in other new member
states as well as in the neighbourhood countries.
It would be tempting to drop one or the other
criterion20, but that would require changing some
key articles of the treaty. This should be possible,
but seems highly unlikely. In fact, the treaty
includes an obligation for the Council to lay down
the details of the convergence criteria referred to
in a main article of the treaty, this Council decision
replacing the relevant protocol to the treaty; the
same obligation exists for the protocol on the
excessive deficit procedure (see details in the
next section). Consequently, it is possible to
strengthen the economic foundations of the
numerical requirements of the current four
convergence criteria relatively easily, ie with a
unanimous decision of the Council. Economic
theory does not provide clear guidelines about
how to determine the magnitudes, but a few
principles can be laid down. 
All criteria should be related to the euro-area
average for at least four reasons:
• First, all prospective applicant countries are
highly integrated into the euro area (if not, they
should be), and hence what happens inside
matters a lot for those outside. This applies
both to the inflation rate and also to the general
economic outlook, which has an impact on
budget deficits both in the euro area and in
applicant countries. 
• Second, it would abolish the peculiar possibility
that non-euro-area countries or very small
countries with which the applicant has virtually
no trade may affect the criteria. 
• Third, it would alleviate the asymmetry of
letting the automatic stabilisers run and
helping the economy with discretionary
stimulus in euro-area countries while doing the
painful opposite of this in applicant countries
during a crisis. 
• Fourth, as countries in the euro area are
declared to have achieved “a high degree of
sustainable convergence”, the convergence of
applicant countries towards the euro-area
average seems a natural requirement.
The inflation, interest rate and budget balance
criteria should allow some deviation from the
euro-area average. New EU member states are
small and open economies characterised by larger
cyclical swings, and thus need greater scope for
counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Moreover, the need
for public sector investment is greater than in old
EU member states. With regard to inflation, new
EU member states have a higher potential growth
rate, which implies structural price-level
convergence, which should be acknowledged. 
One option that would allow some deviation from
the euro-area average is to define the maximum
deviation. For example, the budget balance
criterion could be the average euro-area balance
minus 1.0 percentage points (all measured as a
19. Estonia’s chances also
depend on the business
cycle but the opposite
way: it could not join in
‘good times’ because of
the inflationary
pressures discussed in
earlier sections. But if
the government
squeezes the budget
sufficiently in the midst
of a drop in GDP of about
15 percent in 2009 (in
contrast to euro-area
governments that use
fiscal policy to dampen
their five percent GDP
fall), it may have a
realistic chance of a
positive assessment in
the spring of 2010,
unless the expected
deflation is regarded as
‘unsustainable’.
20. For example, Buiter
(2005) argues that
“achieving fiscal
sustainability prior to
adopting the euro is
essential and it is the
only truly necessary
condition for euro
adoption. It should also
be a sufficient condition
for Eurozone
membership.”THE BALTIC CHALLENGE AND EURO-AREA ENTRY Zsolt Darvas
19
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
percentage of GDP) and the inflation criterion
could be the average euro-area inflation rate plus
1.5 percentage points. (If the deviation should be
1.0 or 1.5 percentage points or another similar
number should be the subject of discussion.)
Another possibility would be to require the
applicant to have better statistics than, say, 25
percent of euro-area members.
The requirement for the ratio of government debt
to GDP could simply be that this ratio should not
exceed the euro-area average (or should be lower
than in at least 25 percent of euro-area
members), unless the ratio is diminishing
sufficiently and approaching the euro-area
average at a satisfactory pace.
In order to ensure that the reformed criteria
provide a better indication of sustainable
convergence than the original criteria, the
compliance period could be increased from the
current one year to the average of the last two or
three years.
Would this change jeopardise the stability and
credibility of the euro area? Certainly not. There
would still be criteria (but more sensible ones) to
keep applicants on their toes. Furthermore, in
good times the new criteria would be tougher. For
example, when the budget is balanced in the euro
area, then the new criterion would (rightly) require
a better budget position from the applicants. The
most important threat to the stability of the euro
area is the lack fiscal sustainability – this is a real
threat for many countries currently inside the
euro area, but potential applicants have much
lower government debt-to-GDP ratios and are
undoubtedly much better prospects in this regard.
And in any case the EU’s surveillance system
needs a fundamental revision to ensure stability
and growth in the whole EU. Furthermore,
prospective applicants from the new member
states would make up a very small share of the
total euro area, and their inclusion would hardly
be noticeable in euro-area aggregates. The
argument that inflation will be higher in the euro
area after admitting countries in which the
Balassa-Samuelson effect is persistent, and
hence inflation must be lower in old member
states in order to meet the ECB’s inflation target
for the euro-area average, is offset by the
magnitudes. According to Darvas and Szapáry
(2008), the impact of the proposed modification
of the inflation criterion on euro-area average
inflation would be less than an additional 0.05
percent per year – a magnitude well within the
measurement error of inflation rates.
Would the revision of the convergence criteria
undermine the trust in EU rules? Clearly not. The
‘flexible’ interpretation of the criteria at many
previous euro-area admissions (see the next
section) should have already undermined public
trust in the process of euro-area enlargement. On
the contrary, revising the criteria to be more
economically rational and to have less scope for
discretionary interpretation would even
strengthen the trust.
Would it be difficult to reach consensus among the
27 member states on this particular change? We
think not. Countries outside the euro area would
certainly support it. Countries inside would feel
more comfortable having rules that make more
sense. The goal is not to weaken the euro-entry
criteria but to make them more sensible. The
change should be carefully orchestrated and
initiated by euro-area member states or European
institutions, not applicant countries. 
The suggested change in euro-entry criteria would
still require substantial effort from applicants, but
it would ease their pain. It would also boost
confidence, helping kick-start the private capital
inflows – rather than inflows of western
taxpayers’ money – that these countries
desperately need. 
‘The large number of violations of the criteria after euro area entry suggests that the criteria
are inappropriate for judging ‘sustainable convergence.’THE BALTIC CHALLENGE AND EURO-AREA ENTRY Zsolt Darvas
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7. LEGAL OPTIONS UNDER THE CURRENT TREATY
FOR INTERPRETING EURO-ENTRY CRITERIA IN
ECONOMIC TERMS
A key question is whether the letter of the treaty
and the precedents provided by the previous
applications of euro-area entry criteria allow a
more flexible interpretation of rules in order to
require more sensible criteria from future euro-
area applicants.
7.1 Full euro-area membership
First of all it is important to recall that for three
countries (Finland, Italy and Slovenia) it is not
unambiguous from a legal point of view whether
or not the exchange-rate criterion was met. The
treaty included and continues to include the
following requirement: “the observance of the
normal fluctuation margins provided for by the
exchange-rate mechanism of the European
Monetary System, for at least two years”and the
protocol added that “...for at least two years before
the examination”21 (without devaluing its
currency on the initiative of the member state
concerned). The most neutral interpretation of this
regulation is that participation in the exchange-
rate mechanism (ERM) is required for at least two
years before the examination. Neither the treaty,
nor its protocol provided any waiver from the
requirement for the minimum period of two years.
The three countries mentioned did not spend the
minimum two-year period prior to the examination
in the exchange-rate mechanism. The 3 May 1998
decision of the Council of course recognised this,
but decided in any case:
“Italy fulfils the convergence criteria mentioned in
the first, second and fourth indents of Article
109j(1); as regards the criterion mentioned in the
third indent of Article 109j(1), the ITL, although
having rejoined the ERM only in November 1996,
has displayed sufficient stability in the last two
years. For these reasons, Italy has achieved a high
degree of sustainable convergence.” (Official
Journal of the European Communities, 1998, p.
32. The article number refers to the treaty in force
in 1999. The first, second and fourth indents cited
refer to the criteria on inflation rate, excessive
deficit procedure and long term interest rate,
respectively. The decision for Finland used the
same wording except that Finland joined the ERM
in October 1996.)
For the other nine countries different wording was
used, eg for Belgium: “Belgium has achieved a
high degree of sustainable convergence by
reference to all four criteria.” The same wording
was used for the other eight countries that had
participated for at least two years in the ERM.
Consequently, the Council decision of 3 May 1998
recognised the absence of the two-year period in
the ERM, but despite this the Council assessed,
based on the recommendation of the Commission
and the EMI (European Monetary Institute), that
the two countries had a stable exchange rate. One
may say that the decision was in line with the
spirit of the treaty, but it is far from being obvious
whether the letter of the treaty was also fully
respected. This ‘flexible’ interpretation of the treaty
should be noted as providing a precedent22.
On other occasions it was rather questionable if
the spirit of the treaty was satisfied, though the
letter of the treaty was formally respected.
Regarding the government budgetary position the
letter of the treaty requires the absence of an
excessive deficit procedure (EDP), which is
decided on the basis of the ratios of government
deficit and debt to GDP. For the latter, the treaty
allows a discretionary decision if “the ratio is
sufficiently diminishing and approaching the
reference value”, ie 60 percent of GDP, “at a
satisfactory pace”. On 1 May 1998 the Council
abrogated the EDP against seven countries that
joined the euro area in 1999, the decision being
substantiated by the discretionary options
allowed by the treaty. However, it was quest-
ionable whether, eg the decline of Italy’s general
government debt-to-GDP ratio from 124.9 percent
of GDP in 1994 to 121.6 percent by 199723
corresponded to the cited requirement. Similar
doubts could be raised for some other countries
regarding the abrogation of the EDP24.
21. All citations of the treaty
and the protocol
annexed to it are taken
from the Lisbon ‘’Treaty
on the Functioning of the
European Union.
Consolidated version”
(Official Journal C 115 of
9 May 2008). The
Maastricht and the Nice
versions have the same
wording, but the
numbering of the
articles is different.
22. A possible alternative
interpretation is that
ERM participation is not
required, but only
exchange-rate stability.
In this case Bulgaria
may immediately apply
for euro-area
membership as it is not
a member of the ERM
but its exchange rate is
fixed to the euro without
allowing any volatility.
23. These figures were used
in the 1998
assessment, but have
been revised somewhat
since then.THE BALTIC CHALLENGE AND EURO-AREA ENTRY Zsolt Darvas
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To sum up, the application of the treaty provides
three precedents where formal adherence to the
exchange-rate criterion was suspicious. There
were some occasions where countries were
allowed to join by formally meeting all the criteria,
but these were the results of questionable
exercising of the discretionary options allowed by
the treaty with respect to the budgetary criterion. 
These precedents are encouraging for the
prospects of new applicants, but only if these past
‘flexible’ practices are also applied in the future. 
Having reviewed some key features of the past
application of the treaty, let us now look at the
flexibility offered by the letter of the treaty and its
protocol for future euro-area applicants25.
1. Inflation.The inflation criterion is benchmarked
against “the three best performing countries in
terms of price stability”. Neither the treaty nor its
protocol define how to determine the best per-
formers. In practice the three countries with the
lowest, but non-negative, inflation rates were
used. As highlighted by many authors (eg, Buiter,
2005; Pisani-Ferry et al, 2008) the applied defini-
tion contradicts the ECB’s definition of price
stability, which defines it as close to, but below,
two percent. There is nothing in the treaty that
would hinder the ECB and the European Comm-
ission from interpreting the three best performers
as the three countries having inflation rates (1)
either below or close to two percent, or (2) the
closest to the average inflation rate of the euro area.
2. Excessive deficit26.The room for manoeuvre is
‘moderate’ for not opening an EDP or for abrogating
a previously-opened EDP when the “ratio of the
planned or actual budget deficit to gross domestic
product at market prices exceeds a reference
value”, which is three percent. The discretionary
options provided in the treaty allow the EDP not to
be applied if “either the ratio has declined
substantially and continuously and reached a
level that comes close to the reference value, or,
alternatively, the excess over the reference value
is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio
remains close to the reference value”27. The words
“exceptional”, “temporary” and “close” are not
defined in the treaty, nor in its protocol. EDPs were
typically opened for budget deficits somewhat
above three percent of GDP, but this does not at all
mean that “close” must be defined this way. The
crisis is clearly exceptional and under exceptional
circumstances, temporariness could last for a few
years. Consequently, there is some room for
manoeuvre, but a proper interpretation of
closeness at a time of a deep crisis will require an
open attitude similar to past ‘flexible’ practices. 
3. Exchange rate. The precedents for the
assessment of this criterion must imply that this
criterion is not really binding. The ‘flexibility’
shown so far (eg Italy, Finland, Slovenia and
Slovakia) should be extended to future applicants.
There is, however, an unsolved issue regarding this
criterion: the conditions for joining the ERM-II.
Without ERM-II membership a country can not join
the euro area even if it has a stable exchange rate
and meets all other criteria28. There should be clear
and transparent criteria for joining the ERM-II.
4. Interest rate.In principle, the long-term interest-
rate criterion serves as a means to assess the
sustainability of the low inflation rate. In practice,
however, this criterion reflects the credibility of the
euro-area accession process: when markets
attach a high probability to eventual euro-area
accession, interest rates will converge, at least to
some extent, regardless of the longer-term
sustainability of the inflation rate. The two
percentage point deviation allowed by the treaty
will almost surely also be sufficient for future
euro-area applicants where euro-accession
prospects are credible. Whenever economic
reasoning supports future euro introduction,
‘The application of the treaty provides precedents where formal adherence to the exchange-
rate criterion was suspicious. Even when countries were allowed to join by formally meeting
all the criteria, there was questionable exercising of discretionary options.’
24. Some authors, eg Buiter
(1995) and De Grauwe
(2009), regard these cases
as violations of the letter of
the treaty as well.
25. In addition to the four
criteria to be discussed
below, the adequacy of
national legislation,
including the statutes of the
national central bank,
integration of markets, the
current-account balance,
unit labour costs and other
price indices are also
examined for countries
wishing to join the euro
area.
26. The Excessive Deficit
Procedure is the crucial
common component in the
Stability and Growth Pact
(that applies to all
members of the EU) and the
euro accession criteria. 
27. The second criterion of
the EDP refers to gross
government debt and its
discretionary option has
already been cited above
when discussing abrogation
of the EDP in the case of
Italy in May 1998. However,
the precedents of letting
countries to join with ratios
well above 100 percent of
GDP must imply that this
criterion will not be binding
for any prospective
applicants having debt
ratios above 60 percent
where they are below Italy’s
and Belgium’s 120 percent
ratios at the time of their
euro area admission.
28. For example, Bulgaria
has a fixed exchange rate to
the euro and all official
documents emphasise the
overriding goal of euro
introduction as soon as
possible. Yet Bulgaria is not
a member of the ERM-II and
it is difficult to fathom why
for an outsider given the
current lack of transpar-
ency of entry conditions.THE BALTIC CHALLENGE AND EURO-AREA ENTRY Zsolt Darvas
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European policymakers can increase the
credibility of applicants’ path toward the euro.
To sum up, there is indeed some room for
manoeuvre in the treaty and in its currentprotocol
regarding formal inclusion in the euro area. But
more importantly, the Council has an obligation to
clarify the four convergence criteria and replace
the current protocol:
“The Council shall, acting unanimously on a
proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the European Parliament, the ECB as
the case may be, and the Economic and
Financial Committee, adopt appropriate
provisions to lay down the details of the
convergence criteria referred to in Article
140(1) of the said Treaty, which shall then
replace this Protocol.” (Article 6 of Protocol 13)
The same obligation exists in the treaty to clarify
the details of the excessive-deficit procedure that
will replace the protocol annexed to the article
discussing the EDP.  In the case of the EDP, some of
the procedures have been detailed, but even the
Lisbon version of the treaty includes the reference
to the Council’s authority to adopt appropriate
provisions. It is time to spell out the details of the
convergence criteria and of the EDP, to strengthen
the economic rationale of the convergence
criteria. In particular, the numerical criteria should
be benchmarked against the euro-area average as
discussed in the previous section. As has recently
been noted by von Hagen and Pisani-Ferry
(2009):“the criteria for joining the euro area were
introduced in order to ensure that economic logic
prevails over political logic, not that legal logic
prevails over economic logic”(p. 25). It is strongly
in the European interest to follow this principle.
7.2 Unilateral euroisation
The Council, the Commission and the ECB have
repeatedly ruled out the possibility of unilateral
introduction of the euro (as legal tender) on the
basis that the treaty provides one and only one
way to the euro. Therefore, for political reasons it
would not be wise to implement a unilateral move
which would earn the clear disapproval of
European policymakers, which is the current
reality. Furthermore, without ECB support, this
would be very difficult to do in technical and
practical terms. If the unilateral move did not gain
credibility, people could start to withdraw their
deposits and various other financial assets in
cash euros. The banking system may not be able
to supply as much euro cash as required, which
may lead to a breakdown of the financial system.
To take a Latin American example, FitchRatings
(2009) argues that in the dollarised Ecuador a
rapid decline in bank deposits or accelerated
capital flight, combined with limited access to
external financing, could lead to a crisis driven exit
from dollarisation.
8. SOME CLOSING THOUGHTS
The three Baltic countries face the deepest
recessions among all countries of the world and it
is not just the fault of the politicians and the
people of these countries that they are in this
predicament. Other eastern European countries
are also suffering disproportionately to their pre-
crisis mistakes. The EU has mobilised resources
to support crisis-hit countries in central and
eastern Europe (Darvas, 2009c) according to its
rule-books, but the EU should be more than just a
rule-book. When everyone is aware that a rule has
deficiencies, action is needed to modify the rule. 
On the one hand, there is broad consensus that an
immediate euro introduction accompanied by
proper other provisions would serve the best
interests of the Baltic countries and the EU as a
whole, but such a solution is not feasible in the
legal sense and would raise many economic and
political issues. On the other hand, it is also clear
that the economic foundations of the current euro-
‘The EU should be more than just a rule-book. When everyone is aware that a rule has
deficiencies, action is needed to modify the rule.’THE BALTIC CHALLENGE AND EURO-AREA ENTRY Zsolt Darvas
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area entry criteria are fundamentally called into
question by the fact that it has been a rule rather
than the exception that euro-area members have
violated the entry criteria since becoming members,
both before the crisis and currently. Adherence to
the current interpretation of the criteria is also
weakened by the precedent of the ‘flexible’ appli-
cation of the treaty at the time of certain previous
admissions to the euro area. The EU’s expansion
from 15 to 27 mem-bers also made the rules tougher
and hence, contrary to common perception, keeping
euro-area entry rules unchanged violates in the
economic sense the equal treatment principle. 
The coincidence of these two consensuses should
be used to grasp an opportunity: reform the euro-
area entry criteria and demand more meaningful
criteria from all future euro-area applicants. Any
solution should not be Baltic-specific but should
be equally applicable to any EU country and
should not incur the risk of moral hazard. At least
the room for manoeuvre in the protocol of the
treaty should be exploited by requiring from future
applicants criteria that make more sense. The best
solution, however, is for the Council to fulfil the
obligation placed upon it by the treaty to lay down
the details of the convergence criteria and the
excessive deficit procedure that will replace the
current protocols. In the midst of an unexpectedly
deep crisis, two decades after the drawing up of
the rules and one decade since the launch of the
euro, it is indeed time to reform the convergence
criteria. In designing the reform, the economic
rationale of the criteria should be strengthened.
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